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Abstract Many  moral  philosophers  have  criticized  intensive  animal  farming 
because it can be harmful to the environment, it causes pain and misery to a large 
number of animals, and furthermore eating meat and animal-based products can be 
unhealthful. The issue of industrially farmed animals has become one of the most 
pressing ethical questions of our time. On the one hand, utilitarians have argued that 
we should become vegetarians or vegans because the practices of raising animals for 
food are immoral since they minimize the overall happiness. Deontologists, on the 
other hand, have argued that the practices of raising animals for food are immoral 
because animals have certain rights and we have duties toward them. Some virtue 
ethicists remain unconvinced of deontic and consequentialist arguments against the 
exploitation of animals and suggest that a virtue-based approach is better equipped 
to show what is immoral about raising and using animals for food, and what is 
virtuous about ethical veganism. 
 







The idea of utilitarianism, roughly, is that an action is right or morally permissible if and only if its 
consequences produce the greatest good for the greatest number of sentient beings. The term ‘‘good’’ 
varies depending on the type of utilitarianism: e.g., for classic utilitarianism the good is happiness; for 
preference utilitarianism the good is preference. 
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In recent years, two important but unrelated events have occurred in ethics. One is 
the return of moral philosophers to an interest in virtue ethics.
1  
The other is the 
interest in ethical veganism. I think that a virtuous approach to morality can be used 
in support of ethical veganism. One wonders why virtue ethicists seldom have 
contemplated this prospect. Apart from the already difficult task of articulating a 
virtue ethics, it is also difficult to defend ethical veganism in a way that is 
satisfactory. Some proponents of veganism suggest that we categorically abolish 
animal exploitation; they argue that using animals or insects as a source of food, 
clothing, and more, is immoral; and even that we should reject all products that have 
been  experimented  on  animals—unconditionally.  This  position,  which  I  call 
absolute veganism, faces the difficulty of justifying such a totalizing claim in the 
face, for example, of those who live in parts of the world where scarcity of plant 
food  or  other  unfavorable factors leave them  with  no  other choice  but   to  use 
animals  to  survive.  Furthermore,  avoiding  products  obtained  from  animals or 
that have been experimented on animals is nearly impossible as almost everything 
has, including soya beans, even water. In addition, the very People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (Peta) state, ‘‘we would not oppose eating eggs from chickens 
treated as companions if the birds receive excellent care and are not purchased from 
hatcheries.’’
2 
The latter, however, may seem to demand too little. Many vegans 
(including myself) would not eat eggs—even from chickens treated as companions. 
Another challenging aspect of ethical veganism is that the typical arguments offered 
in support of veganism do not seem adequate to justify becoming or staying vegans. 
For example, Animalrightsabout.com writes, ‘‘Veganism is the practice of 
minimizing harm to all animals, which requires abstention from animal products, 
such as meat, fish, dairy, eggs, honey, gelatin, lanolin, wool, fur, silk, suede and 
leather.’’
3  
But we should not become ethical vegans only because it may minimize 
harm, and I worry that ‘‘requiring abstention’’ from animal products may be the 
wrong moral attitude. The approaches to ethical veganism that I described, are 
vaguely based on flawed utilitarian or deontic concepts suggesting that, as a rule, we 
abstain from using animals or, as a utilitarian principle, we do what minimizes 
undesirable consequences. My argument is based on virtue. I argue that a more 
conducive defense of ethical veganism is to consider it an expression of virtuous 
character, upon reflection and observation of the lives of animals and their objective 
moral characteristics. I believe that conducting a virtuous life may entail practicing 
veganism, not as an abstention or an attempt to maximize utility, but rather as an 






1   This  revival  began  with  the  famous  G.E.M.  Anscombe’s  article  ‘‘Modern  Moral  Philosophy’’, 
Philosophy 33 (1958). 
2   ‘‘Is it OK to eat eggs from chickens I’ve raised in my backyard?’’ http://www.peta.org/about-peta/faq/ 
is-it-ok-to-eat-eggs-from-chickens-ive-raised-in-my-backyard/. 
3   ‘‘What is Veganism’’ http://animalrights.about.com/od/animalrights101/a/Veganism.htm. 
4   Aristotle, Ethics, IV. 3. 
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Philosophy  and Veganism 
 
A  number  of  contemporary  philosophers  have  discussed the  importance  of  a 
virtuous character, and acquiring the virtues, over obeying moral prescriptions 
derived from universal principles or duty. Some have also suggested that a virtue- 
oriented defense of ethical veganism seems to be more appropriate than the attempts 
made by the various rights theorists or utilitarians.
5  
Shafer-Landau, for example, 
points out that the hitherto arguments about vegetarianism or veganism based on 
deontic or utilitarian defenses at best favor the abolition of factory farming, still 
‘‘this leaves us short of a moral obligation to remain or become vegetarians’’.
6
 
Shafer-Landau thus suggests that perhaps we should abandon deontic and utilitarian 
concepts and instead focus on certain traits of character showing that the practices 
of using animals for food are typically callous. I say ‘‘typically’’ referring to what 
McPherson calls modest ethical veganism, ‘‘the view that it is typically morally 
wrong to use or eat products made from or by’’
7 
animals such as cows, pigs, 
chickens, or fish, or products such as dairy and eggs. Modest ethical veganism does 
not  deem  immoral any  and  all  circumstances  in  which  animals or  animal  by- 
products are used. Rather, it maintains that it is immoral to use animals when 
equal or superior plant-based alternatives are readily available, which is the case for 
most affluent societies. 
Rosalind  Husthouse  is  a  proponent  of   a  virtuous approach  to  the  ethical 
treatment of nonhuman animals. She argues that starting with the question of moral 
status, whether animals and humans are equal in some moral respect, or whether 
animals have rights, is not the correct starting point. Rather, we should begin by 
morally questioning the attitudes that underlie the use of animals. When we do so, 
we often find that we act viciously. Thus, if one is committed to living a virtuous 
life, he or she will change his or her attitude toward the use of animals.
8  
Cheryl 
Abbate also entertains the idea that virtue ethics, rather than utilitarianism or duty or 
rights view, is the appropriate framework for developing a defense of ethical 
veganism. Her claim is that on the one hand, utilitarianism is overly permissive 
because it permits the harming of animals for trivial reasons, so long as aggregate 
utility   is maximized. On the other hand, deontological theory is too restrictive, 
since the prohibition on harming nonhuman animals would make moral agents 
 
5   Utilitarians and deontologists have been the dominant forces in the recent literature on ethical issues 
regarding animals. The literature is vast, but the most influential are the works of Peter Singer, and Tom 
Regan:  Regan, T.  (2004).  The case  for  animal  rights  (Revised ed.).  Berkeley, CA:  University of 
California Press. Singer, P. (1975). Animal liberation: A new ethics for our treatment of animals. New 
York, NY: Avon Books. Singer, P. (1993). Practical Ethics (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. Singer, P. (1980). Utilitarianism and vegetarianism. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9(4), 305–324. 
6   Shafer-Landau, Vegetarianism, Causation and Ethical Theory, Public Affairs Quarterly, Volume 8, 
Number 1, January 1994. 
7   Tristram McPherson, Why I am a Vegan, 1. 
8   See Hursthouse, R. (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hursthouse, R. (2006). Applying virtue ethics to our treatment of other animals. In J. Welchman (Ed.), 
The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Readings in Virtue Ethics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing. Hursthouse, R. (2011). Virtue ethics and the treatment of animals. In T. Beauchamp & R. 
Frey (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of animal ethics. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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incapable of responding to moral tragedies that, at times, may require that some 
animals be  harmed in  order  to  prevent more harm.
9   
Furthermore, Brian  Luke 
argues that the most influential arguments in favor of veganism or vegetarianism 
(especially those proposed by Regan and Singer) rely on conceptions of rights and 
preference that are flawed. Both Regan and Singer, though they propose different 
ethical accounts, share the idea that there is no morally relevant difference between 
animals and humans that could justify animal exploitation. So, Regan argues that 
because animals are ‘‘subjects-of-a-life’’ like humans, in the sense that they feel and 
have desires and a variety of experiences just like us, and because they can be 
harmed just like humans, they also have a value that should be respected. The 
difficulty with these types of arguments is that the symmetry they propose between 
human and non-human animals is questionable. In fact, it may be argued that it is an 
example of anthropomorphism to say that our experiences are similar to those of 
certain animals in a way that is relevant to morality. Michael Tooley, for example, 
argues that it is not immoral to kill most animals because they are not cognitively 
sophisticated enough to have a concept of continued existence; so, depriving them 
of their future is not wrong as it is to deprive a human being who is aware of 
and cares about his continued existence.
10  
Furthermore, as Carl Cohen argues, not 
all suffering is equal, and human suffering, and human pleasure, are much more 
important than animal suffering (or pleasure).
11  
The problem with assuming such a 
symmetry is that since the cognitive capacities of animals are not sophisticated 
enough, and so their suffering, it is suggested, is not as important as human 




Perhaps, the most telling criticism of the so-called symmetry argument is Cora 
Diamond’s ‘‘Eating Meat and Eating People.’’ Diamond writes that the symmetry is 
a ‘‘fundamental confusion about moral relations between people and people and 
between people and animals’’.
13 
She points out that the analogies used in these types 
of arguments are not clear at all, and thus it is difficult to see how they move from 
considerations about human preferences to considerations of animal preferences. 
Diamond argues ‘‘This is a totally wrong way of beginning the discussion, because 
it ignores certain quite central facts—facts which, if attended to, would make it clear 
that rights are not what is crucial’’.
14  
As she points out, people (typically) do not eat 
people, but not for the reasons given by the symmetry argument, that is, because 
they have preferences by virtue of being sentient and they prefer not to be eaten or 
because they have rights. Rather, we do not eat people because we do not regard 
 
 
9   Abbate (2014). Virtues and animals: A minimally decent ethic for practical living in a non-ideal world. 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 27(6), 909–929. 
10   Tooley, M. (1972), ‘‘Abortion and Infanticide’’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 2.1, 37–65. 
11   Cohen, C. ‘‘The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research.’’ The New England Journal of 
Medicine 315, 1986. 865–869. 
12   Brian Luke ‘‘Justice, Caring and Animal Liberation’’ published in The Feminist Care Tradition in 
Animal Ethics, 124–148. 
13   Diamond, 466. 
14   Ibid., 467. 
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them as food. And even if people wouldn’t mind being eaten or they died in 
accidents, and human flesh were delicious and nutritious, we would still not eat 
them. But then, it seems that the symmetry breaks down because it suggests that we 
do not eat or maltreat other human beings because they have certain rights/ 
preferences, which are granted by their being sentient. However, if the analogy 
holds for animals, and demands that we not eat them because doing so may deprive 
them of their right to equal consideration and cause them distress, then this principle 
should  also  hold  for  humans.  Namely,  eating  people  would  turn  out  to  be 
immoral because it deprives humans of their right to equal consideration and causes 
them distress. But this is clearly not the reason we do not eat people. Anyone who 
argues this way, Diamond says, ‘‘runs a risk of leaving altogether out of his 
discussion those fundamental features of our relationship to other human beings 
which are involved in our not eating them’’.
15
 
As Diamond notes, we do not slaughter people for food or eat dead people even if 
no injustice were involved in the cause of their deaths. We do not eat amputated 
limbs (except in extraordinary cases)—even if the meat were good and nutritious. 
But it’s not because we respect people’s morally relevant interests or because they 
are bearers of interests or because we want to maximize   aggregate utility. She 
argues that concepts like ‘‘person,’’ ‘‘friend,’’ and ‘‘pet’’ are morally rich; they 
encompass a number of complex sentiments and moral relations. The reason that we 
do not eat or enslave our friends is because of our nuanced relationship with them; 
similarly, the reason we do not eat companion animals is that we love them, give 
them a name, a place on the couch, a meal in a special bowl, and, at the end of 
their lives, we mourn them and often even give them a burial. People who have 
companion animals do not avoid harming or eating them because they are sentient 
creatures who have rights or preferences, but rather because they are sentimentally 
attached to them and, presumably, respect certain objective moral characteristics 
they see in them. Our complex relationships with others and our feelings toward 




Virtue  Ethics 
 
Considering that deontic and utilitarian arguments defending the moral obligation to 
become vegetarians or vegans are flawed, I shall discuss how virtue ethics can offer 
a more helpful approach. Virtue ethics (VE) maintains that our moral experience 
and our relation with others are too complex, too nuanced, and too textured to be 
captured and understood by a set of principles or rational calculation. When we 
theorize, we detach ourselves from our moral experience and our moral feelings, 
overlooking the importance of our relationship with others and the importance of 
‘‘sympathy, empathy, and compassion as relevant ethical and epistemological 
sources  for  human  treatment  of  nonhuman  animals’’.
16    
In  the  Greek  myth, 
 
15   Ibid., 467. 
16   Josephine Donovan ‘‘Feminism and the Treatment of Animals: From Care to Dialogue’’ 
Signs Vol. 31, No. 2 (Winter 2006), 306. 
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Procrustes offered his bed to guests who wanted to spend the night. If the guests 
were too long for the bed, Procrustes would chop off their legs; and if they were too 
short, he would stretch them so that they could fit. Deontology and utilitarianism 
have done to morality what Procrustes used to do to his guests. VE, therefore, 
believes that the correct way to understand and approach morality is to consider 
each situation and determine what the appropriate moral approach should be and 
which action should be carried out. Most importantly, VE recognizes that people’s 
motives, character, and reasons for acting in certain ways are more important than 
any theory that claims to give moral directions. In other words, if people are just, 
moderate, compassionate, and overall have a benevolent disposition, by virtue of 
their characters, they will do what is right, for the right reason, at the right time, in a 
given circumstance. 
There are important factors in morality, whether an intention is right, whether 
one  is  following the  correct  rule,  or  whether the  consequences of  our actions 
generate  morally good outcomes.  But  these  factors  are  not  primary.  What  is 
primary  for  VE is  whether  the  individual’s  actions  are  expressions  of  good 
character, through the acquisition of the moral virtues. The concept of virtue is the 
concept of morally admirable character traits, the possession of which makes one 
a good individual. A virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable 
person who acts and feels as he or she should, for the right reason considering the 
circumstances. When we help a friend, for example, we should want to do so out of 
friendship and not for the sake of it or because we have ulterior motives. According 
to VE, if you are my friend, I help you because I like you and care about you and 
take pleasure in helping you, and not because I think that I have a moral duty to help 
you or because it turns out that my helping you will maximize overall utility. This 
aspect of VE is one of the main points of disagreement between VE and nor-aretaic 
moral theories. VE regards a virtuous individual as someone who has the virtues; 
virtues have morally right desires built in. In Book II of Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle  discusses  the  question  of  how  one  acquires  the  moral  virtues,  ‘‘the 
virtues… we acquire  by having first put them  into  action’’.
17   
This is possible 
because the capacity for virtue is innate, but has to be brought to a fully developed 
state through practice. For example, it is by repeatedly performing generous acts 
that one develops the virtue of generosity; it is by repeatedly refusing to indulge 
one’s appetite that one develops the virtue of temperance. However, not every 
generous or temperate act is virtuous. If I spend my entire paycheck to buy a friend a 
car or if I refrain from eating all together, or I eat far too much, then I am not doing 
what is virtuous. Consider the virtue of courage. Being courageous is not to lack 
fear but to act in spite of fear. But if I express my courage by robbing a bank, I am 
not exercising my courage in a way that is virtuous. Why? Simply because robbing a 
bank is an action proceeding from a vice that goes against other virtues, such as 
justice. According to VE, the best way to promote social cooperation and harmony 
is for people to acquire a good, reliable character. Rules by themselves may give 
guidelines, but they cannot make people good. Consequences of our actions are 
 
 
17   Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II. 1103a30. 
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important, but without good character we are not likely to produce greater total 




Virtue  and Veganism 
 
In order to see in what sense ethical veganism may be an expression of virtue, it is 
helpful to consider some important aspects of the virtues of temperance, compas- 
sion,  fairness, and  also  of what  Aristotle  calls  greatness of  the  soul.  Aristotle 
discusses temperance and intemperance in Book III. 10–12 of the Ethics in terms of 
bodily pleasure and pain. The intemperate person, Aristotle argues, enjoys ‘‘the 
smells of perfumes and cooked dishes’’.
18  
He describes intemperance as indulging 
in pleasures that are ‘‘slavish or brutish’’.
19  
With regard to eating, too much or too 
little, Aristotle notes, will ruin one’s health. He argues that ‘‘to eat whatever is at 
hand’’
20  
is a sign of intemperance. Conversely, the virtuously temperate individual, 
with regard to food, eats things that are conducive to health, and in moderation, ‘‘as 
long as they are not incompatible with health or vigour, contrary with what is noble, 
or beyond his means’’.
21 
The temperate individual, thus, is not attracted to any kinds 
of foods merely because they smell good or taste good or seem pleasurable. Rather, 
she will eat in moderation, not to satisfy her pleasure, but to be nourished; and she 
will choose those foods that are healthful. From this consideration of what it is to be 
temperate, as it applies to healthful eating, by showing that eating animal products 
can be unhealthful, it seems consistent to say that consuming animal products is 
immoral as it is an expression of the vice of intemperance.  What is important here 
is to consider that it is possible to thrive on a vegan diet, a diet completely devoid of 
animal products, and that health sciences show that consuming animal products can 
be dangerous for one’s health.
22   
Research has shown that eating meat and dairy 
products can cause heart disease, diabetes, obesity, atherosclerosis formation, 
cancer, and other health issues, and that a plant-based diet may lower, and in many 
cases reverse, those conditions.
23  
Let us consider a few examples: 
 
1. Cancer. In 2015, 22 scientists from the World Health Organization (WHO)’s 
International  Agency  for  Research  on  Cancer  (IARC) evaluated  over  800 
medical  studies  and  concluded  that  consumption  of  processed  meat  is 
 
18   Aristotle, III. 10, 1118a, 10. 
19   Ibid. III. 10, 1128a, 25. 
20   Ibid. III. 10, 1118a, 15. 
21   Ibid. III. 10, 1119a, 15. 
22   See Tuso PJ, Ismail MH, Ha  BP, Bartolotto C.  Nutritional Update for  Physicians: Plant-Based 
Diets. The Permanente Journal.  2013;17(2):61–66. doi:https://doi.org/10.7812/TPP/12-085.: ‘‘Research 
shows that plant-based diets are cost-effective, low-risk interventions that may lower body mass index, 
blood pressure, HbA1C, and cholesterol levels. They may also reduce the number of medications needed 
to treat chronic diseases and lower ischemic heart disease mortality rates. Physicians should consider 
recommending a plant-based diet to all their patients, especially those with high blood pressure, diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease, or obesity’’. 
23   Craig  WJ,  Mangels  AR;  American  Dietetic  Association.  ‘‘Position  of  the  American  Dietetic 
Association: vegetarian diets.’’ Am Diet Assoc. 2009 Jul; 109(7):1266–82. 
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‘‘carcinogenic to humans,’’ and that consumption of red meat is ‘‘probably 
carcinogenic to humans.’’ Their conclusions were based on overwhelming 
evidence for positive associations between meat and colorectal cancer, as well 
as positive  associations between processed meat  consumption and  stomach 
cancer, and between red meat consumption and pancreatic and prostate cancer. 
But it is not just processed meats that pose such a health risk. The study also 
shows a link between cancer and consumption of all kinds of animals, including 
‘‘white meat,’’ beef, pork, etc.
24
 
2. Heart  Diseases. In 2005, The China Study examined the link between meat 
consumption and dairy foods, and such illnesses as coronary heart disease, 
diabetes, breast cancer, prostate cancer, and bowel cancer. The authors 
concluded that people who eat a plant-based diet—a diet devoid of meats, fish, 
dairies, eggs, and all animal by-products—will avoid, reduce, or even reverse 
the development of numerous diseases.
25
 
3. Breast Cancer. A 2014 Harvard study found that just one serving a day of red 
meat during adolescence was associated with a 22 percent higher risk of pre- 
menopausal breast cancer, and that the same red meat consumption in adulthood 
was associated with an overall 13 percent higher risk of breast cancer.
26
 
4. Obesity. Meateaters are 3 times more likely to be obese than vegetarians, and 9 
times more likely than vegans. On average, vegans are 10–20 lb lighter than 
meateaters. Vegan diets promote higher metabolic rates, around 16 percent 
faster for vegans compared with meateaters.
27
 
5. Life Expectancy. According to a study published in JAMA Internal Medicine, 
vegetarians may live longer than meateaters. The study concludes, ‘‘Vegetarian 




6. Sickest Population.  It  is  interesting to  note  that  the  U.S., ‘‘where meat  is 
consumed at more than three times the global average’’,
29  
is one of the sickest 
nations in the world, 
 
 
24   Carcinogenicity of consumption of red and processed meat, The Lancet Oncology, Volume 16, No. 16, 
1599–1600, December 2015. http://www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/pr/2015/pdfs/pr240_E.pdf. 
25   T. Campbell’s The China Study: The Most Comprehensive Study of Nutrition Ever Conducted And the 
Startling Implications for Diet, Weight Loss, And Long-term Health, BenBella Books; 1 edition (May 11, 
2006). 
26  ‘‘Red meat consumption and breast cancer risk’’ https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/features/red- 
meat-consumption-and-breast-cancer-risk/. 
27   Montalcini T, De Bonis D, Ferro Y. ‘‘High vegetable fats intake is associated with high resting energy 
expenditure in vegetarians’’ Nutrients. 2015;7:5933–5947 
Fraser G, Haddad E. Hot Topic: Vegetarianism, Mortality and Metabolic Risk: The New Adventist 
Health Study. Report presented at: Academy of Nutrition and Dietetic (Food and Nutrition Conference) 
Annual Meeting; October 7, 2012: Philadelphia, PA. 2011. 
28   ‘‘Vegetarian  Dietary  Patterns  and  Mortality  in  Adventist  Health  Study  2’’  JAMA Intern  Med. 
2013;173(13):1230–1238. doi:https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2013.6473. 
29   ‘‘Trends in meat consumption in the United States’’ Public Health Nutr. 2011 Apr; 14(4): 575–583. 
Published online 2010 Nov 12. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S1368980010002077 and the Economist’s 
Apr. 30, 2012, article ‘‘Kings of the Carnivores’’ Apr 30th 2012, 15:40 By The Economist Online, http:// 
www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/04/daily-chart-17. 
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The United States spends much more money on health care than any other 
country. Yet Americans die sooner and experience more illness than residents 
in many other countries. While the length of life has improved in the United 
States, other countries have gained life years even faster, and our relative 




The rate of obesity, heart disease, high cholesterol, and diabetes, in the U.S. has 
been growing exponentially.
31  
Consider the deleterious health consequences that 
can be caused by the consumption of animal products, we can say that an individual 
who has the virtue of temperance will not eat meat or other products derived from 
animals. Surely, one may argue that the idea of temperance is an idea of moderation, 
and  eating  animal  products  in  moderation  (perhaps)  will  not  be  as  harmful. 
However, we have to consider, again, that eating animal products is not essential. In 
affluent countries such as the United States that have access to an abundance of 
plant-based food, meat eating is practiced out of pleasure or tradition. In such a 
situation, we should ask what a temperate agent would do. It seems plausible that, 
given the potential harm of an animal-based diet, and this diet not being essential to 
most people who have readily available plant foods, the temperate individual will 
not indulge in those types of food—not even moderately—because they are not 
conducive to health, and it does not require a sacrifice to eat a plant-based diet. As 
Aristotle points out, one should not indulge in certain bodily pleasures when one can 




At the end of Book III of the Ethics, concluding the discussion of what it means 
for a person to be temperate and intemperate, Aristotle reminds us that the 
 
appetitive element in a temperate person ought to be in harmony with reason; 
for the aim of both what is noble, and the temperate person’s appetite is for the 





Ethical veganism argues that killing animals for food and other products is 
unnecessary when it is done by people who have an abundance of readily available 
plant-based alternatives; and therefore, in that case using animals is immoral. 
Furthermore, ethical vegans avoid eating animals because, being concerned about 
health, they avoid what is conducive to health issues. In this sense, ethical veganism 
is an expression of temperance. As I illustrated above, health sciences do not speak 
in favor of an animal-based diet, but rather confirm the benefits of a plant-based 
 
 
30   U.S. Health in International  Perspective: Shorter Lives, Poorer  Health, National Research Council 
(US); Institute of Medicine (US); Woolf SH, Aron L, editors. Washington (DC): National Academies 
Press (US); 2013. 
31 ‘‘Obesity Information’’ http://www.heart.org/ HEARTORG/Healthy Living/WeightManagement/ 
Obesity/Obesity-Information_UCM_307908_Article.jsp#.WGci9bGZNE4. 






diet. In light of these facts, meat eaters who have easy access to an abundance of 
plant-based food of equal or superior nutritional value to animal-based food are 
intemperate  because they  unnecessarily indulge in  foods  that  are  not  essential 
or conducive to health—but in fact, as health sciences continue to show, animal- 
based food can have deleterious effects on our health. 
Another expression of virtue that appears to be consistent with ethical veganism 
is the feeling of compassion. Aristotle discusses how compassion is an important 
moral feeling that the virtuous individual possesses and uses at the right time and for 
the right reason. He defines compassion as follows, 
 
Let compassion be a sort of distress at an apparent evil, destructing or 
distressing, which happens to someone who doesn’t deserve it, and which one 





For Aristotle, compassion is the pain felt at the misfortune one believes to have 
befallen another when the suffering is serious rather than trivial, the belief is held 
that the suffering is undeserved, and the sufferer may be without fault (in the instant 
case, animals used as a source of food when not strictly necessary) or the deplorable 
consequences may outweigh the fault, affecting our sense of injustice.
35  
Compas- 
sion is an important moral feeling connected with a good moral character that we 
need to have ‘‘at the right time, about the right things, towards the right people, for 
the right end, and in the right way, is the mean and best; and this is the business of 
virtue.’’
36  
Since virtue involves having the right feelings and performing the right 
action, a compassionate individual will not only feel compassion, but also act 
compassionately. As Roger Crisp writes, 
 
Someone with the virtue of compassion will act in ways characteristic of 
someone who feels compassion appropriately. She will offer the right kind of 
help in the right kind of way rather than ignoring the other’s plight on the one 





Therefore, the idea of a compassionate individual is that she will perform 
compassionate actions in the proper way, that is, knowing what she is doing, 
choosing the  actions appropriately for their  own sake (or, for the  sake of  the 




With regard to animals, then, what are the actions of a compassionate individual 
toward them? To be compassionate means to be concerned about others’ pain, with 
the  hope  of  alleviating  it  and  that  some  positive  good  will  emerge  from  the 
 
34   (Aristotle 1959, 2.8, 1385b 13–16) 
35   Aristotle, Rhet. 1386a6–7, 1385b14, b34–1386a1, 1386b7, b10, b12, b13, 1386b14–15; and Poetics 
1453a4, 5. 
36   Ethics, II.6, 1106b18-19; 1106b21–7. 
37   Crisp, ‘‘Compassion and Beyond’’, 243. 
38   Ethics, II.4, 1105a. 
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sufferer’s unfortunate situation. Since being virtuous entails performing the proper 
action from a well-grounded disposition, then being compassionate entails being 
altruistic, that is, acting in such a way as to help others who are suffering. A 
compassionate individual takes action to increase or maintain others’ happiness. 
Since  most  animals  are  capable  of  suffering  or  living  a  pleasant  life,  a 
compassionate individual would avoid practices that cause pain to animals and 
also would try to maintain their happiness. Notice that this view is compatible with 
the thesis that animal suffering is qualitatively different from human suffering. I am 
not  arguing  that  animal  suffering  and  enjoyment  and  human  suffering  and 
enjoyment are qualitatively the same. My claim is that killing an animal just for 
the sake eating steak, for example, is callous when equally or better nutritious plant- 
based alternatives are readily available. A compassionate individual has empathy. 
Empathy ‘‘recognizes connection with an understanding of the circumstances of the 
other.’’
39  
An empathetic individual tries to understand thoroughly the situation and 
circumstances of others and cares about their well-being. These ‘others’ may be 
close to us or far away, other humans or non-human animals. Empathy enables us to 
extend our love to victims of some natural catastrophe, for example, who may live 
at the other side of the world. In the case of our treatment of non-human animals, the 
compassionate individual has empathy for them and tries to understand what matters 
for them. A compassionate individual, therefore, will not merely try to alleviate the 
pain of an animal who, for instance, is about to be slaughtered by caressing him or 
by giving him a tranquillizer or by making his death as quick as possible. This 
would not be the full expression of compassion. Rather, a compassionate individual, 
who has empathy, also recognizes that animals do not only wish to avoid pain, but 
also wish to survive and flourish. Consequently, by definition, a compassionate 
person would oppose all forms of animal exploitation. But just like other virtues, 
compassion seems to lie between two excesses. One way, for example, an individual 
would be too compassionate is by putting his own well-being at risk. It would be a 
form of excess of compassion if one refused to wash his hands to protect germs, or if 
he denied food to his children to feed strangers, or allowed rats to take over his 
apartment. Conversely, one would not be compassionate enough if he deliberately 
killed animals for fun, or just for the sake of it; or, in the instant case, having an 
abundance of nutritious plant-based food, he indulged in eating products derived 
from the exploitation and death of animals. Ethical veganism is the idea that we 
should avoid using animals for food or clothing when we have equal or superior, 
readily available plant-based alternatives, as it is the case in many developed 
countries. 
A typical objection is that eating meat would seem consistent with compassion as 
long as animals are treated with respect. However, from my evaluation of 
compassion, it does not appear to be the case. Many people may claim that the 
compassionate way to use animals for food is to allow them to live a happy life. This 






virtue of compassion. For VE, it is not sufficient to be compassionate only in some 
instances.
40  
The very idea of compassion is not only to suffer with or share others’ 
suffering but also to make a positive contribution to their happiness. If we truly treat 
animals well and are concerned about their well-being, it seems peculiar that we 
might do this with the intention of eventually killing them to have them as food. 
Using the adverb ‘‘compassionately’’ to modify the verb ‘‘kill’’ is not sufficient to 
make killing a compassionate act. Therefore, one may not claim to be compas- 
sionate in the complete sense of the virtue if one’s actions involve acts such as 
killing animals merely because their cooked flesh tastes good and gives them a great 
deal of pleasure. One must be thoroughly and consistently compassionate toward 
animals. Also, one is not truly compassionate by simply refraining from directly 
being cruel to or directly exploiting animals. One must also not be party to the 
exploitation of animals; he must not purchase leather, fur, meat, or choose to remain 
ignorant or inactive by shrugging it off and say that he cannot do anything about it. 
Here I consider as a premise that for virtually all people who live in affluent so- 
cieties, eating meat is a caprice rather than a strict necessity. Consequently, it is in 
no way compassionate to kill an animal for food or entertainment or for fun or even 
if it is done in a way that minimizes or avoids pain. As Stephens points out, a 
‘‘compassionate person would feel moral discomfort, or even revulsion, enjoying 
something made possible only by the suffering of another.’’
41  
Therefore, insofar as 
veganism is the position according to which we should not kill animals or use their 
body parts and by-products when other equal or superior plant-based foods or 
clothing are readily available, veganism is an expression of virtue, more precisely, it 
is an expression of compassion. 
Another aspect of virtue that enables us to see what is virtuous about veganism is 
what Aristotle calls the crown of the virtues, that is, greatness of the soul, which he 
discusses in IV.3. Greatness of the soul consists in thinking oneself worthy of great 
things and being concerned about honor. A great-souled individual, in other words, 
possesses great moral qualities, such as compassion, temperance, and a sense of 
justice in the sense of what is right or wrong in a given circumstance. What emerges 
from an analysis of what it is to be a great-souled individual is ‘‘the sort of person to 
do good,’’ and ‘‘It would be quite unfitting [for a great-souled individual] to run 
away with his arms swinging, or to commit an injustice’’.
42  
The kind of picture we 
get of the great-souled individual is a magnanimous, and just individual who cares 
about others and is not afraid to help the vulnerable. 
A great-souled individual must be just. Being just means to avoid actions in 
accordance with vice, such as committing adultery or wanton violence.
43  
The just 
individual is a fair individual.
44  
It might be objected that Aristotle here is talking 
about civic justice. But I believe his definition of the just in terms of a fair individual 
is broad enough to be relevant to the question of our treatment of animals. Aristotle 
 
40   See Hursthouse 1999, p. 14. 
41   Stephens, ‘‘Five Arguments for Vegetarianism,’’ p. 33. 
42   Aristotle, IV.3, 1123b, 30, 1124b, 18. 
43   Ibid. V. 1129b, 21. 
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views the just and fair individual as a great-souled individual. He says, ‘‘the best 
is…the one who exercises [his virtue] in relation to others…’’ and what ‘‘tends to 
produce or to preserve happiness’’.
45  
In other words, the virtuous individual, as a 
great-souled individual, would be against wanton violence, exploiting people or 
animals. A fair individual recognizes that hurting animals intentionally is unfair. 
Also, a fair-minded individual acts out of justice to ensure that everyone receives 
what he or she deserves. Being fair means ensuring that others receive the deserved 
treatment. For example, it is unfair to deny certain benefits to a group of people 
solely on the basis of, say, their color, gender, or race. The fair individual is fair to 
all, regardless of their skin color, nationality, height, age, species, and so on. Also it 
seems plausible to say that, following this idea of fairness, it is unfair to raise and 
kill animals for food when plant-based foods are readily available. Eating and using 
animals typically causes countless animals to suffer and be killed for trivial reasons, 
such as taste, fashion, and amusement. In societies where plant food is readily 
available and abundant, using animals as a source of food is, by definition, unfair. 
Virtue  ethics  here  agrees  with  deontology  and  consequentialism about  the 
moral importance of taking into account animal conscious experience and their 
capacity to suffer; but while utilitarianism argues that these two factors should be 
taken into account so as to maximize overall happiness or preference, and 
deontology regards them as the basis for duty or rights, for VE animals’ mental 
capacity and their capacity to feel pain or pleasure inform our virtuous character of 
their moral importance. That is to say, animals’ conscious experience and their 
capacity to have a great life, or a miserable one, give us an objective reason to be 
compassionate toward them and treat them with respect. 
The notion that animals are conscious and feel pain is no longer a controversial 
one. For example, studies now show that it is not only large animals, but also ‘‘there 
is adequate behavioral and physiological evidence to support pain attributions to 
fish’’.
46  
As cognitive ethologists Donald Griffin points out, it is arbitrary to deny 
animals a level of self-awareness; most of the animals that are typically regarded as 
food, cows, pigs, lambs, chickens, and others, are conscious and aware of their own 
bodies and actions. Animal thoughts and emotions may be simple compared to 
humans’ in the sense that perhaps animals can think only of matters of immediate 
importance, so in that sense their awareness of the world is said to be not as 
sophisticated as that of human beings. However, Griffin argues, consciousness is not 
an all-or-nothing attribute. Most animals are complex enough to be able to organize 
and retain information about many aspects of their lives. For example, they 
recognize different odors to which they react in different ways, suggesting many 
subjective feelings and awareness.
47  
If this is correct, killing such animals, merely 
to satisfy our taste for a certain dish, is immoral because they experience the world 
and killing them deprives them from their future existence and experiences. When 
we consider carefully the mental capacity of animals and we consider what it is to 
be a great-souled individual, that is, a compassionate, magnanimous, caring, and 
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fair individual, it seems quite unlikely to claim that a great-souled individual might 
treat animals with compassion (for instance in very high welfare production 
systems), and then decide to eventually kill them with minimal pain and suffering in 
order to eat them. The practice of killing animals to eat them—not out of necessity 
but rather for trivial reasons—is not in accordance with the actions of a great-souled 
individual who is compassionate, temperate, and fair. Again, considering that eating 
meat is not required to thrive, and considering that in well-developed societies there 
is an abundance of plant-based food of equal or superior nutritional value to meat, it 
follows that killing animals and eating them is immoral. If it is not out of necessity, 
then eating meat is a practice justified merely by tradition, taste, convenience, or 
other trivial reasons. Animals experience the world. They are individuals. Although 
they may not be, cognitively speaking, as sophisticated as human beings, it would 
seem that they want to enjoy their existence. It follows that tradition, convenience, 
and  taste are  not  good  reasons  to  use  animals,  even  ‘‘humanely.’’  If  we  are 
consistently fair, we will not merely try to  ameliorate  the living  conditions of 
animals with the intent to eventually turn them into food or clothes, or try to kill 
them with minimal pain. Rather, if we are fair, compassionate, and temperate, we 
will avoid exploiting them in the first place. Using their bodies, their skin, their 
milk, their fur, or their eggs is therefore immoral, as well. Ethical veganism argues 
that when plant food is readily available, using animals for food is unnecessary, 
unfair, cruel, and also unhealthful, and thus it is an immoral practice. Therefore, 
ethical veganism embodies the virtues of compassion, fairness, temperance, and 




Eating  Meat and the Destruction  of the Environment 
 
In addition to the charge that eating animals is callous, unfair, and unhealthful, also 
ethical vegans avoid animal products because raising animals for food can be 
harmful to the environment and, in turn, can be harmful to humans. 
Raising animals for food requires massive amounts of land, food, water, and 
energy. It is a known fact that a staggering amount of global greenhouse-gas 
emission is caused by animal agriculture.
48   
According to the United Nations, a 
global move toward a vegan diet is necessary to ‘‘save the world from the worst 
impacts of climate change’’.
49  
Growing crops to feed animals, cleaning pollution 
from factory farms, and satisfying animals’ thirst require an enormous amount of 
water. The numbers among studies vary, but to have an idea consider that a single 
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And according to the USGS Water Science School, ‘‘About 460 gallons 
for 1/4 lb of beef, or about 1750 L per 113 g’’ of water are required.
51
 
Considering the great number of animals raised for food, it is not surprising that 
they produce enormous amounts of waste that inevitably pollute our waterways 
more than all other industrial sources combined. Also, pesticides, chemicals, 
fertilizers, hormones and antibiotics involved in animal agriculture degrade the 
environment and cause human health problems. Runoff from factory farms and 
livestock grazing pollute our rivers and lakes. The USEPA notes that bacteria and 
viruses are carried by the runoff and contaminate groundwater.
52
 
Furthermore, using land to grow crops to feed animals is inefficient. According to 
the U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification, 
 
In India, annual grain consumption per person amounts to around 400 lb per 
year, while in the United States, it is 1500 lb. It is crucial to understand that of 
these 1500 lb, only 300 lb are directly consumed as bread, cereals or pastry. 
The great bulk of the rest is used for meat production. While three pounds of 
grain are needed to produce a one-pound gain in live weight of pigs, seven 




It takes almost 20 times less land to feed someone on a plant-based (vegan) diet 
than it does to feed a meat-eater since the crops are consumed directly instead of 






I have argued that a virtue-based approach is the correct moral framework to justify 
ethical veganism. I pointed out that deontic and consequentialist accounts are 
incapable of defending the conclusion that we should be or become vegans. 
Essentially, the reason these moral approaches fail is that they lose sight of the 
important issue about our treatment of animals by focusing on abstract principles 
such as duty or rights or maximization of utility; they also try, unpersuasively, to 
show a symmetry between the moral value of humans and that of animals. My focus 
has been to show that it is more plausible to frame a defense of ethical veganism by 
starting from a question of what it is to be what Aristotle calls a great-souled 
individual. As I have argued, this individual is compassionate, just, and temperate. 
Consequently, acquiring those virtues and acting from them will motivate ethical 
veganism. That is to say, a virtuous individual is compassionate, caring, sensitive to 
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